Dns amplification attack windows 2008

For more information about RRL, see the following articles:. Other parameters may also help administrators better manage RRL settings. These settings include RRL exceptions. DNS Logging and Diagnostics. Q1: Does the mitigation that is summarized here apply to all versions of Windows Server? A1: No. This information does not apply to Windows Server or R2. However, instead of taking preventive actions such as dropping or truncating responses , the server instead logs the potential actions as if RRL were enabled, and then continues to provide the usual responses.

Windows Server , all editions Windows Server version More Need more help? Expand your skills. Get new features first. Was this information helpful? Yes No. Thank you! Any more feedback? The more you tell us the more we can help. NS [example: dig. NS DumbCoder 5, 3 3 gold badges 27 27 silver badges 40 40 bronze badges.

Add a comment. Active Oldest Votes. Not being familiar with that particular DNS software I can't advise on how to do that. Alnitak Alnitak k 70 70 gold badges silver badges bronze badges. Sign up or log in Sign up using Google. Sign up using Facebook. Sign up using Email and Password. Post as a guest Name. Email Required, but never shown. The Overflow Blog. How can setup my windows dns server to only response to query about local sites?

I remove all root hints, and forwards, but still it received and response to query about isc. OK - first things first: Either firewall your server so people outside your organization can't access it, or disable recursion :. Chris posted a handy picture of the page and the option you want to enable Do this now.

Now that you are no longer actively breaking the internet you can read about DNS amplification attacks , how they happen, why they're bad, and some of the things you can do to prevent being a pawn in them. You can then determine how best to prevent your server from being used in such attacks. Typically you will do this by only answering recursive queries for a known group of hosts your internal machines , but other options exist as well.

The problem is that the query is around 94 bytes and the response stating it is an NXDOMAIN is a minimum of bytes so the attack is slightly amplified and almost always coming from a spoofed ip.

You must also have the dot zone. When the dns server is a public authoritative server, it needs to allow queries from anyone and any where for the zones it carries so you can not limit by p and other steps you can use for private or internal dns servers. The next version of dns from Microsoft that ships with will have RRL which will help greatly, too bad they didn't release this much needed functionality that Bind has had for years. When you run an authoritative dns server and jerkwad script kiddies or those wanting to cause your dns server additional traffic can and WILL send queries to your dns server from spoofed ips for domains that your server is NOT authoritative for.

If the dot. Only until you create the dot zone can you reduce the response to what I stated bytes. And if I recall, any time you start filling the dot zone with any records other than the SOA, the response packets grow larger.

I have studied this for quite a while, and have tried many things, and based upon my research, what I detailed above seems to be the best way to reduce the outgoing response as much as possible. If you have not done so, read up on the domain I listed about along with dns attacks as it is the single most requested domain name in this kind of attack.

Granted, it is often associated with an attack on a recursive server, but these kinds of attacks DO take place on authoritative servers with recursion disabled. I have servers running that have the root hints cleared, with recursion off, and have spent a great deal of time studying the packets with wireshark during these kinds of attacks and not once have I even seen response like you detailed. I admit I know just enough about wireshark to make me slightly dangerous.

Do you have or know of a live demo or lab where I could see this in action? Do you happen to know what the size of that response would be since any reduction in packet size would be an improvement? By the way, there is also the query block list, but that also does NOT refuse query's for domain in the list. The response packets went from bytes to over bytes so now I was apmplifying the attack by a factor of So if someone throws a meg at me I am sending out 10X the bandwith for queries I am not authoritative for to an ip that did not send the request.

I do wish that the suggestion would have worked and I was sure I had tried that before but did so once again since I just happened to have a live attack situation to try it. Sign up to join this community. The best answers are voted up and rise to the top.

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